It’s been three full days of competition at Vancouver for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games… and there have been three major Engineering failures by the Canadian organizers. You would think Canada would at least employ some engineers who were up to snuff for the Olympics – alas, it was not to be.
Mechanical / Electrical Engineering – Olympia Ice Resurfacers
In a bid to create the ‘greenest games ever’, to make everything carbon neutral, the Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC) decided to use electric powered Olympia-branded ice resurfacing machines for the marquee Richmond Olympic Oval instead of the tried-tested-and-true (but gas powered) Zamboni machines in used nearly everywhere else in the world (including Calgary and Salt Lake City, the two fastest venues in the world).
In the last two days of long track speed skating competition, the ice resurfacing machine (more precisely, the three ice resurfacing machines) have failed spectacularly, breaking down on the ice surface on numerous occasions, leaking snow and hot water all over the racing surface, causing huge delays and concerns about the safety and integrity of the competition.
In a country where there are as many ice rinks as churches, and where the arenas operate nearly 24/7, one would hope that we could at least make one of these damn things work. Instead, the world was treated to a spectacle of failure not once – but on two separate competitions with two separate machines.
Here’s where the Engineering fails. Sure, it was probably unexpected that one of the machines broke as the lever raising the scraping blade stopped working. One failure is acceptable in the grand scheme of things. However, on the second day, they used their backup machine, which had the exact same problem. Now, it becomes obvious that there was a major design flaw leading to the same failure on both machines. But wait: here’s what struck me as extremely odd. The ice operators thought about this problem enough to have two machines (safety factor is good)… except ‘Plan A’ was exactly the same as ‘Plan B’.
Anyone who’s worked on an Engineering project knows that something will break, something will probably fail. That’s why you have safety factors and Plan Bs. In most cases, Plan Bs are practical, and ’sure things’. In this case, their Plan B was no different than Plan A, and knowing that Plan A failed, they continued nonetheless with their flawed backup plan.
Plan C? Well, that was even worse – the third machine, owned by the City of Richmond, who owns the facility (and not VANOC), tore up the ice entirely, creating giant potholes as the operators forgot to remove the studs in the wheels.
Operations / Structural Engineering – Cypress Mountain Standing Room Gallery
By now you’ve undoubtedly heard about the lack of snow and ice at Cypress Mountain, the site of mogul skiing and snowboarding just north of Vancouver. About one month before the Games began, the organizers could no longer wait for the snow. They decided to truck and airlift snow from nearby sites. However, to reduce the use of snow where not necessary, the organizers used hay bales to fill out some of the features and terrain on the hills, and covered the surface with snow.
This has proven to be successful enough for the hillside itself, as the moguls and snowboard cross events have already been finished (despite some weather related delays). On the other hand, it has been a massive failure for general public.
You see, VANOC had designed the audience gallery with both seating and standing admission. There was a large seating section made of big bleachers at the bottom of the hill – and immediately in front of this seating grandstand was standing room for about 8,000.
The problem is, this standing room was on top of the hay. For whatever reason, VANOC had decided to line the ground where spectators were expected to stand with the giant hay bales they were using to shape the terrain, and covered it with snow. With the relentless rain that hit Cypress Mountain in the recent days, the snow covering the standing room had been all but wiped out. What was left was a huge layer of slush on top of a 6-foot layer of hay, causing a massive danger for anyone standing on top (very much like quicksand).
Look at this picture:
It is a little difficult to see due to the size, but notice the bales of hay right in front of the seating, where 8,000 fans were supposed to stand.
Who in their right mind designs standing room on top of hay? There are so many things wrong with this, I don’t even know where to start. For one, the structural properties of hay, are, well, less than stellar. Wet hay? Let’s not even get started.
Thus, 20,000 standing room tickets have been canceled for various snowboarding events, in addition to over 8,000 on the day after the rain storm. VANOC will refund these $50 tickets (at a loss of $1.5 mil) - but we all know there are bigger issues. Some people have travelled across the world just to watch one or two events, and many are not out of luck with no alternative, permanently ruining their Olympic experience. Others, I am sure, have bought these tickets from auctions or scalpers, paying much more than the $50 face value, and now being able to get no more than that in return for their efforts.
Structural Engineering / Architecture – Luge Track
Much has been written about the Luge Track since the extremely unfortunate death of Georgian luger Nodar Kumaritashvili. In the aftermath, everyone has been pointing fingers at everyone. The various national luge federations have blamed the designers (who also created the 2002 Salt Lake City track) for creating the world’s fastest – and most dangerous – track. The lugers themselves have blamed VANOC for not allowing enough practice runs prior to the Olympics (the Georgian rider had gone down the track over 20 times before his death – by comparison, the Canadians had each gone down over 300 times). Worst of all, the International Luge Federation has blamed Nodar Kumaritashvili himself for not being skilled enough.
Importantly, the cause of death is pretty well established. There is no doubt that the luger’s 140 km/h head-first crash into the large steel support columns killed him.
Now, I hate to show this photo, as we have all seen it a thousand times, along with the video replays of the horrific event. But some explanations need to be made.
Notice two things here. On the right of the picture, there are the obvious tall steel beams, which support the overhang structure at the finish line, just beyond where the crash occured. Next, at the end of the track, notice the half-wall on the right, which is, for some inexplicable reason, angled outwards. As anyone who has seen the video can attest, the luger was out of control by this point, and was being thrown along the wall, reaching past the end, and into the steel column at an extremely high speed.
Why were the steel columns exposed, and not walled off? Why was the wall angled outward towards the beams? These questions will forever haunt the engineers and architects who designed this section of the track, I am sure. VANOC has since addressed both of these issues, building a wooden wall to cover the columns, and extending the half wall as well as removing the angle.
They have also changed the starting position, ruining the competition for many riders, who had practiced hundreds of times on the old configuration, and now must readjust (arguably making it more dangerous) in the span of only a couple of days.
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My fellow engineers and I should heed the lessons learned here, and uphold our oath to safety.


